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I. INTRODUCTION

The jurisprudence governing ownership of minerals is the product of
a mix of competing policies generally designed to avoid giving literal effect

1. Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. Special thanks to Kara
Crawford, now a second-year law student at Washburn, who provided research assistance for
this article and offered valuable comments on initial drafts.
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to the "plain" meaning of the term "minerals." For example, if 0, the owner
of the land in fee, conveys "all the minerals" in the land to A, the only thing
we know for sure is that A does not get "all the minerals" and the grantor 0
impliedly retains certain "minerals."2 This will be the result even in a state
with a statute requiring that "every conveyance of real estate shall pass all
the estate of the grantor therein, unless the intent to pass a less estate shall
expressly appear or be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant."3 The
"all minerals" interpretive exercise seeks to mitigate the rule of property that
gives the owner of the "minerals" the implied right to make reasonable use
of the surface for their development.4 The need to mitigate the "reasonable
use" rule arises from another rule of property which exempts the mineral
owner from any obligation to pay damages for disruption of the surface estate while engaging in reasonable use to develop the granted minerals.5
Therefore, to limit the "no damage" aspect of the "reasonable use" rule,
courts have developed jurisprudential techniques to limit the scope of the
minerals granted in the first instance.6 If A does not receive the "minerals,"
the reasonable development of which would damage O's retained surface
estate, the uncompensated use of the surface for mining can be avoided.
However, these judicial machinations have resulted in some ugly, tortured
jurisprudence for defining mineral ownership.7
Rules of construction have played a major role in ensuring the outcome of the interpretive process is the "right" one; an outcome that protects
the surface owner from uncompensated destruction of the surface. In this
2.
See, e.g., Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. Wyoming State Highway Comm'n, 757 P.2d
1001, 1004 (Wyo. 1988) (reservation of "all mineral[s] and mineral rights" does not include
gravel).
3.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2202 (LexisNexis 2003). Literal application of such a statute
could result in fundamentally different results, under identical documents, depending upon
whether the "all minerals" are being conveyed or excepted by the grantor. The "all minerals"
conveyed would be interpreted broadly to give maximum effect to the phrase while an exception would be interpreted narrowly, limiting the scope of the phrase. See Stevens Mineral Co.
v. State, 418 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("Deeds should be strictly construed
against the grantor so that the grantee is conferred the greatest estate that the terms of the deed
will permit .... Thus, a reservation or exception by the grantor in a deed must be narrowly
construed.").
4.
Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 776 P.2d 736, 741 (Wyo. 1989) ("Under
the rule of reasonable necessity, a mineral lessee is entitled to possess that portion of the
surface estate 'reasonably necessary' to the production and storage of the mineral.").
5.
See, e.g., Black Gold Petroleum Co. v. Hill, 108 P.2d 784 (Okla.1940). Many states
have addressed surface damages, for oil and gas operations, by statute. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit.
52, § 318.5 (LexisNexis 2003). However, these statutes do not address most of the minerals
that will result in significant destruction of the surface when they are mined.
6.
Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) ("We have previously attempted to create a rule to effect the intent of the parties to convey valuable minerals to the mineral estate owner, while protecting the surface estate owner from destruction of
the surface estate by the mineral owner's extraction of minerals.").
7.
See generally David E. Pierce, Toward a FunctionalMineral Jurisprudencefor Kansas, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 223 (1987).
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area the forays into a search for the "intent of the parties" have been more of
a make-weight exercise to justify a desired outcome. However, when the
issue is not surface protection, but rather which of two competing interest
owners will enjoy the mineral, the search for the parties' intent can have real
meaning. The reality, however, is that neither party probably had any specific intent regarding the unspecified mineral at issue - such as coalbed
methane. Typically the same evidence establishing the grantor had no specific intent regarding coalbed methane will also establish the grantee had no
specific intent. Therefore, the interpretive process often turns on what the
court thinks should have been their specific intent - which is merely another
way of saying the court decides the issue as a matter of law.
Regardless of the process by which a court arrives at the presumed
specific intent of the parties, it will often merely be a disguised decision by
the court to resolve the dispute applying substantive property rules selected
by the court. These courts will "define" the parties' "specific" intent. The
Wyoming Supreme Court, in a series of cases concerning ownership of coalbed methane, has engaged in the interpretive process with the goal of ascertaining the parties' general intent,' recognizing that if the parties had expressed a specific intent the matter would most likely not be in litigation.
The Wyoming court seeks to "ascertain" the parties' "general" intent by
applying procedural contract principles of interpretation.
II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CHOICES: SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTY RULES VS.
PROCEDURAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES

The approaches to the coalbed methane issue to date can be placed
in two broad jurisprudential categories: (1) "substantive rules of property"
that define ownership when applied to the written documents; and (2) "procedural contract principles" that establish the evidentiary process to ascertain
the intent of the parties regarding ownership. The "property" approach seeks
to provide prospective predictability by adopting a set of rules that can be
applied to any conveyance to resolve the ownership issue. The "contract"
approach is not so concerned with predictability or prospective impact, but
rather seeks to give effect to the intent of the parties on a case-by-case basis.
A.

The Use of Substantive PropertyRules to Define CoalbedMethane
Ownership

The first approach, which I label "substantive property rules," relies
upon a judicially-adopted rule of property to govern the parties' rights. For
example, a court might hold that anytime "coal" is conveyed it is the conveyance of a "container" which includes anything within the confines of the
8. See, e.g., Caballo Coal Co. v. Fidelity Exploration & Prod. Co., 84 P.3d 311 (Wyo.
2004); Hickman v. Groves, 71 P.3d 256 (Wyo. 2003); McGee v. Caballo Coal Co., 69 P.3d
908 (Wyo. 2003); Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540 (Wyo. 2002).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004
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coal container, including coalbed methane gas. This has been referred to as
the "container theory." 9 Another example of a property rule approach would
be to simply rule "gas" is not "coal" so a conveyance of coal does not include gas that might be found within the coal.'0 The primary appeal of the
property rule approach is it has precedential value allowing it to be applied
by title examiners, and others, to documents not before the court. To the
extent the rule is applied to the language contained in a written document,
and the consideration of evidence extrinsic to the written document is controlled, the rule will provide a level of predictability to define property interests.
An example of a "substantive property rule" approach is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge"
interpreting the following 1920 conveyance of:
All the coal of the Pittsburgh or River Vein underlying all
that certain tract of land... Together with all the rights and
privileges necessary and useful in the mining and removing
of said coal, including the right of mining without leaving
any support...,
the right of ventilation and drainage and of access to the
mines for men and materials ....
The parties of the first part [surface owners] hereby reserve
the right to drill and operate through said coal for oil and gas
without being held liable for any damages. 2
In holding the right to any gas, coalbed methane or otherwise, belongs to the
owner of the coal, the court adopts the following container theory:
When a landowner conveys a portion of his property, in this
instance coal, to another, it cannot thereafter be said that the
property conveyed remains as part of the former's land,
since title to the severed property rests solely in the grantee.
In accordance with the foregoing principles governing gas
ownership, therefore, such gas as is present in coal must
necessarily belong to the owner of the coal, so long as it re-

9.
Roberts v. Ambassador Oil Corp., No. C-94-43, slip op. at 10-11 (D. Okla. filed Jan.
19, 2001).
10.
Id. at 5-7.
11.
468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
12.
Id. at 1382.
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mains within his property and subject to his exclusive dominion and control.' 3
The balance of the court's opinion seeks to bolster its initial legal
conclusion that a conveyance of coal includes coalbed methane found in the
coal. It is revealing that the dissenting opinion uses the same facts to conclude that the conveyance of coal did not include coalbed methane. 14 In essence the court gives the term "coal" the same effect as the conveyance of all
minerals within a specified formation or depth. For example, instead of using the word "coal" to describe the confines of the formation - the "container" - it could have just as easily been a conveyance of all minerals within
the "XYZ geologic formation."' 5 The major weakness of this analysis is the
term "coal" may define the container but it does not indicate that "all minerals" within the container are being conveyed or retained with the coal. This
is where the court's imputed specific intent fills the void, the container, with
coalbed methane: "It strains credulity to think that the grantor intended to
reserve the right to extract a valueless waste product with the attendant potential responsibility for damages resulting from its dangerous nature."' 6 It
is doubtful the grantor had that intent at all; the intent was probably to reserve the ability to develop any "oil and gas" that may become economical
to develop regardless of the coal rights being granted.
When the term "gas" is at issue, a similar analysis can be used to
confer the coalbed methane to the "gas" owner. Usually this analysis consists of the following syllogism: coalbed methane is gas, coal is not gas, and
therefore the owner of "gas" owns coalbed methane. For example, in Carbon County v. Union Reserve Oil Co., Inc.,"7 the deed conveyed "all coal and
coal rights . . . ." Holding that "coal" did not include coalbed methane
"gas," the court relies on "definitions from various sources" revealing "that
coal and gas are mutually exclusive terms."' 9 This is coupled with the
court's conclusion: "The plain language of the deed says 'coal and coal
rights.' The grant does not mention gas of any kind."2 The court also feels
compelled to support its conclusion with a rule of construction:
[W]hile a reservation of the right to drill for oil and gas is
not found in the deed to Union Reserve, the express grant of
one specific mineral does not imply the grant of all other
minerals not referred to in the grant. The maxim expressio
13.
Id. at 1383.
14.
Id. at 1389 (Flaherty, J.,
dissenting).
15.
It could also have been expressed as "all minerals within an area located within § 30
in an area within 1000' to 1500' below the surface."
16.
Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1385.
17.
898 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1995).
18.
Id. at 682.
19.
Id. at 686.
20.
Id. at 688.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004

5

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 4 [2004], No. 2, Art. 4
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 4

unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another) is routinely cited in Montana case
law.2 '
It is a safe bet that when the court starts dragging out Latin phrases it will
soon be arriving at its chosen outcome as a matter of law.22
Once you select the substantive property rule approach, the content
of the actual "rule" is less important than the decision to define a rule. Intent
does not matter, so the rule you select does not really matter. What does
matter is the jurisprudential decision to use a rule vs. no rule.
B.

The Use of ProceduralContractPrinciplesto Ascertain Coalbed Methane Ownership

The second approach, which I label "procedural contract principles,"
relies upon an evidentiary process for ascertaining the intent of the parties,
without regard for rules of property. This approach is concerned with one
thing: the intent of the parties to the document. I have used the word "contract" because courts have generally assumed that uniformity of result and
predictability, in the contract setting, are not all that important. Instead, the
critical task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties to the
contract. Under the American freedom of contract model, absent some flaw
in the bargaining process, or illegality in the underlying agreement, the public interest lies in giving effect to the agreement freely made by the parties.
Courts do not, or at least should not, have a stake in the outcome of the process, so long as it is pursued to give effect to the intent of the contracting parties.
The major weakness of the "process" for ascertaining the intent of
contracting parties is the inconsistency in decisions regarding the components of the process and how each component should be applied. The process includes the parol evidence rule and basic contract interpretation principles: two areas where judicial decisions, and the giants of classical contract
law,23 are at odds. Cases in this area are like a trip through AmJur: you can
find a case to support any proposition. The problem in this area has not been
manipulation of the process, but rather agreeing upon the proper components
of the process.
The dispute regarding process focuses on a single issue: when can
courts consider evidence beyond a written document to ascertain what the
parties intended by the document? This issue has been addressed by first
21.
Id. at 684.
22.
See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of InterpretingMineral Deeds
and Leases. An Encyclopedia of Cannons ofConstruction, 24 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 1 (1993).
23.
Samuel Williston (1861-1963) and Arthur Linton Corbin (1874-1967).
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determining what constitutes the terms of the document,24 and second ascertaining the meaning of those terms.25 Although this is presented as a twostep process,26 it will often be necessary to determine the meaning of the
terms as a matter preliminary to application of the parol evidence rule. Until
a preliminary meaning is assigned to the writing, it is not possible to determine whether the parol evidence is inconsistent with the writing. 27
However, even when the process is properly applied, it still can be
subject to judicial manipulation to achieve a desired outcome. This manipulation is most often accomplished by injecting rules of construction into the
process. Often a rule of construction negates the search for the parties' intent, or even negates the intent when found. For example, in Energy Development Corp. v. Moss,28 the court begins by rejecting any attempt to apply a
substantive property rule stating,
There is a great temptation in this case, urged on us by both
sides, to wave a wand and declare coalbed methane to be either "coal" or "gas." The logic of either position is facially
seductive; "coalbed methane" is indeed "methane" in that
both have the same chemical composition; but "coalbed
methane" is also intimately bound to the coal, which must
be disturbed if coalbed methane is to be produced in paying
quantities."
The 1986 conveyance was made in an oil and gas lease which "let
lease and demise.., all of the oil and gas and all of the constituents of either
in and under the land hereinafter described in all possible productive formations therein and thereunder ...."" The lessors owned the land in fee and
the issue was whether they had leased the right to produce coalbed methane
to the lessee, Energy Development Corporation.3'
Perhaps most revealing is the court never focuses on the language
"in all possible productive formations therein and thereunder" but instead

24.
This is where the parol evidence rule is properly applied.
25.
This is where rules of interpretation, such as the "plain meaning rule," operate.
26.
This assumes the writing rises to the level of an "integrated" agreement. If it is not an
See generally
integrated agreement, then the parol evidence rule will not apply.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1981) ("An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.").
27.
Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448,454 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1963) ("[T]he parol evidence rule does not even come into play until it is first determined what the true agreement of the parties is - i.e., what they meant by what they wrote
down.").
28.
591 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 2003).
29.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 139.
30.
Id.
31.
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focuses only on the term "gas." It would seem that since the coal formation
is, in any event, a "formation," the reference to "all... gas.., in all possible
productive formations" would be significant. It appears this language was
ignored to support the trial court's latent ambiguity finding: on the face of
the lease it covers "gas" but when its application to coalbed methane gas is
considered, it becomes ambiguous.32 This ambiguity finding accomplishes
two goals: first, it allows the court to consider extrinsic evidence; and second, it invites the use of rules of construction. Although the court purports
to be searching for the intent of the parties, its search is blunted by applying
perhaps the most misapplied of all rules of construction: "'The general rule
as to oil and gas leases is that such contracts will generally be liberally construed in favor of the lessor, and strictly as against the lessee."' 33
The extrinsic evidence the court accepts is that in 1986 there was no
coalbed methane development in the area and the lessee had not engaged in
any coalbed methane development up to the time of trial. 4 The court then
"construes" the lease strictly against the lessee and in favor of the lessors,
noting, anecdotally, "[T]his Court has noted that a lessor may often be at an
informational or technical disadvantage, and must often rely upon the advice
of the lessee or his or her agent."35 The only evidence offered concerning
any discussions with the lessor was testimony offered by two witnesses for
the lessee that they specifically discussed the issue of coalbed methane with
one of the original lessors, since deceased. The trial court discounted this
evidence because neither witness could recall the unique setting of the lessor's home where they said the discussion took place.36 The court's ultimate goal was not to ascertain the intent of the parties, but rather, as the dissent notes, to protect the "surface owners, who, in the case before us, also
retained ownership of the coal in and underlying their land, free and clear of
any coal lease or deed severing ownership of the coal from ownership of the
surface."3 7
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court purports to be ascertaining the intent of the parties, by searching for a non-existent specific intent,
the court is able to find it lacking, depart from the express terms of the
document, and resort to a rule of construction and selected factual findings
to arrive at the outcome it desired. Over fifty years ago Professor Kuntz,
writing in the Wyoming Law Journal,noted the futility of searching for spe-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

143-44.
144.
145-46.
144.
140 n.9.
156 (Albright, J., dissenting).
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Instead,
none
cific
when
of he
the counseled
parties: that in such cases the
theexists."
general intent
searchintent
should
be for
The intention sought should be the generalintent rather than
any supposed but unexpressed specific intent, and, further,
that general intent should be arrived at, not by defining and
re-defining the terms used, but by considering the purposes
of the grant or reservation in terms of manner of enjoyment
intended in the ensuing interests."
Wyoming has chosen to employ Professor Kuntz's analysis to arrive at a
more enlightened jurisprudential approach to ascertaining coalbed methane
ownership.40

III.

AN ENLIGHTENED JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH TO COALBED
METHANE OWNERSHIP: THE WYOMING APPROACH

Four Wyoming Supreme Court decisions, released within an eighteen-month period, establish and apply "procedural contract principles" to
ascertain the ownership of coalbed methane. 4 ' The general jurisprudential
thrust of these cases is captured by the following statement by the court in
Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co.:42 "Rather than following some rigid
rule of law, we believe this issue should be governed by the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of this warranty deed. ' 3
A.

Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co.: Mitigatingthe PlainMeaning
Rule

The court started fashioning its present analysis in Newman v. RAG
Wyoming Land Co. which required interpretation of a 1974 conveyance by
the fee owners" to RAG Wyoming Land Company's ("RAG") predecessor
in interest.45 The fee owners granted "all coal and minerals commingled
with coal that may be mined or extracted in association therewith or in conjunction with such coal operations" while reserving to the grantors "all oil,
38.
Eugene 0. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYO. L. J. 107
(1949).
39.
Id. at 112.
See, e.g., Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 546 (Wyo. 2002).
40.
Caballo Coal Co. v. Fidelity Exploration & Prod. Co., 84 P.3d 311 (Wyo. 2004);
41.
Hickman v. Groves, 71 P.3d 256 (Wyo. 2003); McGee v. Caballo Coal Co., 69 P.3d 908
(Wyo. 2003); Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540 (Wyo. 2002).
53 P.3d 540 (Wyo. 2002).
42.
43.
Id. at 549.
The term "fee owners" is used to indicate ownership of both the surface and mineral
44.
estates.
45.
Id. at 541. The original conveyance was by Alfred M. Morgan and Norvin D. Morgan to Meadowlark Farms, Inc. Id. at 541-42. The Morgans interest ultimately passed to
Newman and other Morgan heirs. Id. at 542. Meadowlark conveyed its interests to RAG. Id.
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gas and other minerals except as set forth above."
The issue is whether
after this conveyance Newman, the successor in interest to the grantor, retained ownership of coalbed methane gas found within the "coal" conveyed
to RAG.
The court begins the interpretive process by acknowledging that the
"governing principle of contract construction is determination of the parties'
'
intent from the language of the instrument itself."47
Although the "parties'
intent" will govern their rights and obligations, the process by which that
intent is ascertained is typically the major issue. If it is determined "from
the language of the instrument itself," must the court limit its inquiry to the
"four comers" of the deed? The court responds to this issue by describing a
classical, objective, "plain meaning" approach:
When the provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the 'four comers' of the
document in arriving at the intent of the parties. In the absence of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its terms because no construction is appropriate."
However, after restating the plain meaning rule several times, the
court adds, "In interpreting unambiguous contracts involving mineral interests, we have consistently looked to surrounding circumstances, facts showing the relations of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the
apparent purpose of making the contract." 49 This provides a basis for considering "extrinsic evidence;" evidence other than the express terms contained within the deed.
The extrinsic evidence considered by the court in this case includes,
in the general order mentioned by the court, the following:
1. The grantors entered into an oil and gas lease covering "oil, gas, and casinghead gas, and other minerals" in 1968.50
2. The grantee, in 1971, was conducting coal mining operations on surrounding lands."'
3. The grantee, in 1974, obtained an option to acquire the grantor's 1,560acre ranch, which included 200 acres of coal lands owned by the grantors.5 2
46.
47.
48.
2000)).
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee P'ship Co., 2 P.3d 535, 539-40 (Wyo.
Id. at 544 (quoting Boley v. Greenough, 22 P.3d 854 (Wyo. 2001)).
Id. at 542.
Id.
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4. Oil and gas production, and coal mining, proceeded simultaneously on
the land. 3
and gov5. "In the 1970s, the value of coalbed methane was recognized,
54
development.
its
encourage
to
available
became
grants
ernment
6. "Commercial development of coalbed methane in the Powder River Basin began in the early 1990s. Prior to that time, coalbed methane escaped
from the coal in the course of the open pit surface mining process, and no
attempt was made to capture that gas as a valuable resource.""5
7. "Coalbed methane is chemically identical (CH 4) to gas produced through
conventional methods, and each is known as 'natural gas."' 56
8. "CBM gas exists in the coal in three basic states: as free gas; as gas dissolved in the water in coal; and as gas 'adsorbed' on the solid surface of the
coal, that is, held to the surface by weak forces called van der Waals forces.
These are the same three states or conditions in which gas is stored in other
rock formations.""
9. Webster's New World Dictionary for definitions of:
"in conjunction," "extract," "release," and "ventilate.""

"in association,"

10. The 200 acres at issue was the only privately-owned coal in the area
which was surrounded by coal on federal lands.59 "In 1981, the Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior issued an opinion" that the reservation of coal
in United States patents issued after 1909 did not include ownership of coalbed methane.' The United States Supreme Court affirmed this position as
to reservations of coal under the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910.61
Therefore, the coalbed methane in the surrounding federal lands is not
owned by the coal owner.62
The court then proceeds to interpret the express terms of the deed
while considering extrinsic evidence it classifies as "surrounding circum-

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

543.

545.
548 n.4.
543.
548 n.4.
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stances."63 The court uses extrinsic evidence to conclude the grantor's "gas"
reservation was intended to include gas found anywhere within the granted
land while the grantee's coal-related gas rights were in the nature of an
easement to dissipate the gas to the extent necessary to efficiently mine the
granted coal.' The circumstances when the conveyance was made in 1974
were most important in defining the possible scope of the grantor's reservation and the rights conveyed to the grantee. As the court notes,
[T]hese terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning to reasonable persons at the time and place of their use;
i.e., 1974 in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming.... [A]ll
agree that, in 1974 when the warranty deed in question was
drawn, any gas found in the coal seam was not mined
through a well bore but was ventilated or wasted while the
coal was produced by excavation in the course of surface
mining.65
This finding is combined with the grantor's prior efforts to develop the gas
potential of the property by entering into an "oil and gas" lease in 1968 and
simultaneous development of gas, and coal, leading up to commercial coalbed methane operations in the 1990s.'
These extrinsic facts are used to limit the scope to the grant of "minerals... mined or extracted" with coal while providing a broad scope for the

term "gas" in the reservation.67 The court therefore holds,

Under the plain meaning of the terms chosen by the parties
to the deed, we cannot conclude they intended to include
coalbed methane as a mineral 'mined or extracted in association therewith or in conjunction with such coal opera-

63.

Id. at 549 (stating that the general intent of the parties "should be governed by the

facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of this warranty deed").
64.
The court's "purpose" analysis provides:
In the case before us, we know the purpose of the mining company's purchase of the property was to allow the development of a surface coal mining operation. On the other hand, the landowners were fully aware that
their property had value for its gas development as they had previously
leased their oil and gas interest and had received the benefit of royalty
payments. Their purpose in executing the warranty deed was to realize
additional value from the property through the sale of the surface and
their limited coal rights.
Id.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 545.
Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 545.
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tions' when it can only be produced through wells as any
other gas."'
The court seeks to give effect to the "general" intent of the parties
noting they failed to express their "specific" intent regarding coalbed methane. Considering the language of the deed and all the surrounding circumstances, the court concludes the general intent was for the grantor Newman
to enjoy the "gas" in the property and the grantee RAG to enjoy the "coal,"
realizing that mining coal may, of necessity, cause the release of some coalbed methane gas. Commenting on the jurisprudential nature of its approach,
the court states, "Rather than following some rigid rule of law, we believe
this issue should be governed by the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of this warranty deed." ' 9 The court notes this means ownership
can be ascertained only on a "case-by-case" basis because not only the terms
of the deed can vary, but the "surrounding circumstances" can vary. 0
B. McGee v. Caballo Coal Company: The Terms of the Deed Remain Important
Eight months after its decision in Newman, the court had an opportunity, in McGee v. Caballo Coal Company,7 to apply and refine its coalbed
methane analysis. However, the terms of the conveyances, granted during
the same 1974 time frame, allowed the court to apply much of the same
"plain meaning" and "surrounding circumstances" analyses used in Newman.72 The relevant extrinsic evidence was provided by each party's expert
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 549.
The court acknowledges the issue by posing the following questions:
How is the parties' intent to be determined when minerals become valuable long after a conveyance by (1) discovery of new methods of production; (2) changes in economics making production of a previously known,
but unwanted, mineral profitable; or (3) discovery of the presence of minerals not previously known to exist?

Id. at 546.
71.
69 P.3d 908 (Wyo. 2003).
72.
The deeds conveyed:
[A]I! coal and all other minerals, metallic and nonmetallic, contained in or
associated with coal and which may be produced with coal ....
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING to Grantor all oil, gas and other minerals in said lands which Grantor now owns, other than those included
above in the conveyance to Grantee .... "
Id. at 910. Although the deeds reference "minerals... which may be produced with coal" the
contracts providing for the conveyances state, "which may be mined and produced with coal.
." Id. (emphasis added). Normally the terms of the contract would be merged into the
deeds, but the deed contained "a non-merger clause" which states, "This deed is executed
pursuant to agreement between Grantor and Grantee dated December 17, 1973, the provisions
of which are not merged herein." Id. The court indicates that even without the non-merger
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witness: Mr. Goolsby, a "geologist" and Mr. Gorody, an "earth science professional."73 The court relies upon their testimony to conclude that coalbed
methane is not "mined" with the coal, but rather is released into the atmosphere as the coal seam is exposed by surface mining.74
The trial court determined that because future technological advancements may allow coalbed methane to be "mined and produced" as part
of the coal mining process, it was conveyed with the coal as "all other minerals metallic or nonmetallic, contained in or associated with coal and which
may be mined and produced with coal ... ."" Reversing the trial court, the
supreme court focuses on the temporal nature of the inquiry: "this reasoning
[by the trial judge] is effectively thwarted and must be considered inappropriate when it is recognized that the parties in 1973 clearly could not have
had this manner of production in mind because it only became known long
after the conveyance. 76 As in Newman, the state of affairs regarding the oil,
gas, and coal industries at the time of the conveyance play a major role in
defining what the parties could have contemplated regarding the "coal" conveyed and the "gas" reserved.
C.

Hickman v. Groves: Defining the Universe ofExtrinsic Evidence

Less than a month after issuing its opinion in McGee, the Wyoming
Supreme Court, in Hickman v. Groves,77 considers whether coalbed methane
is encompassed by a 1944 reservation of "all oil and commercial gravel
rights.""8 The trial court held, as a matter of law, the reservation of "oil
rights" did not reserve any gas rights, including rights in coalbed methane.79
This case presents the true test for the court's rulings in Newman and McGee
that allows consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the terms of an
"unambiguous" conveyance. The parties who reserved the "oil rights"
sought to offer evidence that "oil" rights includes "gas" rights. 0 The grantee
objected, contending "oil" is a plain term of an unambiguous deed the meaning of which cannot be expanded or changed by extrinsic evidence."' The
supreme court responds by holding summary judgment was improper be-

clause the terms of the contracts would be admissible as "surrounding circumstances" to
determine the meaning of the term "produced" in the deeds. Id. at 912 n. 1.
73.
Id. at 911.
74.
Id. at 914-15.
75.
Id. at 910, 915 (emphasis added).
76.
Id. at 915.
77.
71 P.3d 256 (Wyo. 2003).
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 257.
80.
Id. ("Appellants argue the district court erred by not considering the historical context
and rural background of the makers of the warranty deed.").
Id. at 257-58.
81.
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cause a material issue of fact exists regarding the usage of the term "oil
rights" by landowners in rural Wyoming in 1944.82

If it was not evident already from its holdings in Newman and
McGee, the court in Hickman signals that the "plain meaning rule," at least
as to mineral deed interpretation, is merely the first step in a multi-step interpretation process." The goal of the process is to ascertain the intent of the
parties who entered into the mineral deed. Therefore, the inquiry in this case
must focus on the situation circa 1944 when Jerry Hickman, and wife Effie
F. Hickman, executed the deed that was delivered and accepted by Ed R.
Willard. 4
The second step becomes identifying the sort of extra-deed "extrinsic" evidence that can be presented to ascertain the intent of the parties. The
merger doctrine makes the deed the final written expression of the transaction between the parties by merging any agreements regarding the conveyance into the deed. 5 This is consistent with the parol evidence rule which
views the deed as the final written expression that discharges all prior oral
and written agreements encompassed by the conveyance. 6 The modem
view of the parol evidence rule is it merely operates to define the terms of
the final agreement of the parties; it does not restrict extrinsic evidence to
determine the meaning of those terms.8 7 To the extent the extrinsic evidence
82.
Id. at 261.
83.
This could also be viewed as an outright rejection of the plain meaning rule by the
Wyoming Supreme Court. To the extent the plain meaning rule is viewed as limiting the
interpretive inquiry to the language within the four comers of the document being interpreted,
this is clearly no longer the "rule" in Wyoming.
84.
Hickman, 71 P.3d at 256, 261.
85.
For example, in Tilley v. Green Mountain Power Corp., the deed granted an easement
which expressly authorized the utility "to renew, replace, add to and otherwise change the
line .. " 587 A.2d 412, 413 (Vt. 1991) (emphasis added). When the utility sought to "add"
lines to its power poles, the grantor of the easement asserted the utility, prior to entering into
the deed, assured him "the power line would not be enlarged in scope." Id. The supreme
court holds the trial court erred by considering this verbal assurance as a "surrounding circumstance." Id. at 414. Instead, the verbal assurance violated the parol evidence rule because
it contradicted an express term of the deed. Id. The court concludes stating, "the verbal assurance was not simply a context giving meaning to the written agreement; rather, the verbal
assurance was an oral, contractual term directly contradicting the later written expression of
agreement." Id.
86.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) ("(1) A binding integrated
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. (2) A
binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent they are
within its scope.").
87.
As I have written previously:
Technically, the parol evidence rule has nothing to do with the "interpretation" of contract terms. Instead, the rule simply defines what agreements constitute the "contract" that will be interpreted. The rule defines
the evidence that can be considered in ascertaining the terms of the contract. After identifying the universe of terms, the rule has done its job.
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is not offered to bring new terms into the deed for interpretation, the parol
evidence rule is not triggered. Therefore, in theory the universe of extrinsic
evidence may include any relevant evidence designed to assist the court in
ascertaining the intent of the parties. This could include statements of the
parties concerning their intent, so long as they do not seek to add to, or contradict, the terms of the deed.8" However, it does not appear the Wyoming
Supreme Court has elected to go this far, yet. Instead, the court defines the
universe of extrinsic evidence as evidence designed to inform the court regarding the "surrounding circumstances" at the time the conveyance was
made.
With regards to the second step in the analysis, it is not necessary
that the conveyance be "ambiguous" before considering extrinsic evidence.
Even unambiguous language requires interpretation. As the numerous decisions with justices split on the issue demonstrate, 9 the ambiguity test has
never been a reliable basis for admitting or excluding extrinsic evidence.
Once the plain meaning rule is abandoned, the ambiguity test becomes unnecessary. Although the writing remains some of the most important evidence, it will be considered in light of all relevant evidence available to assist the court in its basic task: ascertaining the intent of the parties.
Quoting extensively from a recent edition of Williston's A Treatise
on the Law of Contracts,9 the court defines what it considers to be extrinsic
evidence encompassed by the phrase "surrounding circumstances:"

Determining what the universe of terms "mean" is not a task for the parol
evidence rule but rather for the law governing contract interpretation.
David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of Industry Custom and Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation (to
be published in Vol. 57 SMU L. REv. (2004)) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Pierce, Usage
in Oil & Gas Litigation].
88.
If offered to change the terms instead of interpreting the terms, it would be prohibitted
by the parol evidence rule when the deed is a fully integrated agreement. Consider, for example, the deed in McGee v. Caballo Coal Co., which expressly indicated it was not intended
to be the fully integrated agreement of the parties. 69 P.3d 908, 912 n.1 (Wyo. 2003).
89.
E.g., Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001 (Wyo.
1988) (one concurring and two specially concurring opinions with Justice Rooney finding the
mineral conveyance ambiguous while the other justices would find it unambiguous but apply
differing rules to resolve the interpretive issue).
90.
11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 32:7 (4th ed. 1999).
Although the quotation comes from the current edition of Professor Williston's treatise (Professor Williston died in 1963) the principles are anything but Willistonian. Professor Williston would probably be disappointed to learn that his treatise now reports, as law, the interpretive approach advocated by Professor Corbin, who promoted an interpretive rule directly at
odds with that of Professor Williston. The interpretive issue addressed by the Wyoming
Supreme Court goes to the heart of the intellectual clash of these contract titans: what role, if
any, should extrinsic evidence play in contract interpretation. Williston placed great faith in
the written word and therefore the traditional plain meaning rule; Corbin placed great faith in
the fallibility of the written word and the need to consider all evidence, intrinsic and extrinsic,
associated with its use.
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[T]he term refers to the commercial or other setting in which
the contract was negotiated and other objectively determinable factors that give a context to the transaction between
the parties. Such matters as, for example, whether one or
both parties was new to the trade, whether either or both had
counsel, and the nature and length of their relationship, as
well as their age, experience, education and sophistication
91

The goal is to try and put the court into the exact situation in which
the original parties to the deed found themselves at the time the conveyance
was made. The court also notes the important role usage evidence can play
in properly recreating the surrounding circumstances. 92 In addition to technical terms the parties may use, the way an industry does things - trade usage - is often relevant in understanding why a certain term or phrase was, or
was not, used in the deed.93
The owners of the "oil and commercial gravel rights" offered several
affidavits in the summary judgment proceeding as evidence that a usage
existed in 1944 where oil and gas rights were referred to as "oil" rights.9'
They also offered evidence regarding the educational and personal backgrounds of the grantors and the grantee. 95 The owners of the balance of the
mineral rights countered with their expert's affidavit that the terms "oil" and
"gas" have a well-known meaning in the oil and gas industry.' The parties'
evidence raises an issue of fact regarding the surrounding circumstances
which the court holds can only be resolved by trial, not summary judgment. 97
D. Caballo Coal Company v. Fidelity Exploration & Production Company:
Applying the InterpretiveProcess
Eight months after Hickman, the court had another opportunity to
apply its interpretive process in Caballo Coal Company v. Fidelity Explora-

91.
Hickman v. Groves, 71 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2003), quoting WILLISTON, supra note
90, § 32:7, at 439.
92.
Usage evidence is merely a type of surrounding circumstances evidence.
93.
Hickman, 71 P.3d at 260-61. Pierce, Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation, supra note 87
("The modem definition of industry 'custom and usage' is simply: the way things are done
within an industry.").
94.
Hickman, 71 P.3d at 261.
95.
Id. ("affidavit ... which detailed the somewhat meager educational background and
simple ranch related living and business conditions experienced by his father and mother,
Jerry Hickman and Effie F. Hickman, the grantors of the warranty deed, as well as the ranching related life and business background of Ed R. Willard, the grantee of the warranty deed").
96.
Id.
97.
Id. (remanded for further proceedings).
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tion & Production Company,98 another coalbed methane case. The 1975
deeds provide:
GRANTOR... CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to THE
CARTER OIL COMPANY, GRANTEE, . . . all of
GRANTOR'S undivided interest in and to the coal upon and
within and underlying the following described lands ....
TOGETHER WITH all of GRANTOR'S UNDIVIDED interest in and to all other minerals, metallic or nonmetallic,
contained in or associated with the deposits of coal conveyed hereby or which may be mined and produced with
said coal, subject to the reserved royalty hereinafter provided."
Unlike the deeds in McGee and Newman, the grantor did not reserve any
"oil, gas and other minerals" but instead conveyed to the grantee the coal
and "all other minerals, metallic or nonmetallic, contained in or associated
with the deposits of coal conveyed .. .. ""
As in the prior cases, the court begins by looking to the terms of the
deeds but also considers the relevant surrounding circumstances applying its
"historical context analysis."'' 1 However, the court ultimately relies upon
the express terms of the deeds to conclude the parties had the general intent
to convey all minerals, including coalbed methane, contained within conveyed coal seams.0 2 The court's careful parsing of the express terms of each
conveyance prompted it to mention, for the first time in its coalbed methane
cases, a rule of interpretation: "[A]ll parts of and every word in a contract
should, if possible, be given effect. 'We must avoid construing a contract so
as to render one of its provisions meaningless, since each provision is presumed to have a purpose."" 3 It is apparent, however, this interpretive rule
was cited merely to support the court's independent conclusion under the
facts, not as a rule to resolve a factual dispute.

98.
84 P.3d 311 (Wyo. 2004).
99.
Id. at 313.
100.
Unlike the conveyances in McGee and Newman, the grant included minerals "contained in or associated with the deposits of coal conveyed or which may be mined and produced with said coal .... Id. (emphasis added). The McGee and Newman conveyances
required that the other minerals be not only "associated with the deposits of coal conveyed"
but also be "mined and produced with said coal ...." Id. at 317 ("As the language used
within the applicable deeds is stated in the disjunctive, only one of the circumstances need be
found.").
101.
Id. at 315.
102.
In each of the court's coalbed methane decisions it has concluded, as a matter of law,
that coalbed methane is a "mineral." Id. at 317 ("In Newman and McGee, we recognized that
CBM is a mineral under Wyoming law.").
103.
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Corpening, 19 P.3d 514 (Wyo. 2001)).
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E. The Next Logical Step
Currently the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the following
principles regarding mineral deed interpretation:
(1) Although the express terms of the deed are important evidence of
the parties' intent, the "meaning" of those terms often requires consideration
of the context in which the deed was made. 104
(2) The court need not declare the deed "ambiguous" before considering extrinsic evidence relevant to establishing the context in which the
deed was made.
(3) The types of extrinsic evidence that can be considered to establish the context of the deed include any relevant evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances at the time the parties entered into the conveyance,
including usages at the time, and any specialized meaning given to technical
terms used by the parties.
At this time it appears litigants in future cases will have to determine
whether the Wyoming Supreme Court will consider extrinsic evidence that
does not fall within the general category of "surrounding circumstances"
evidence. The proper role of the parol evidence rule will also need to be
defined. The other major battle ground will be whether the evidence, although relevant surrounding circumstances evidence, is "reliable." Because
much of the extrinsic evidence will be offered through expert witnesses, 5
the Daubert reliability analysis must be considered." °6 This will also require
that courts determine how to apply Daubert to non-scientific situations
104.

In another article, I describe the importance of "context" as follows:
As defined by Webster's, "context" means: "the parts of a written or spoken statement that precede or follow a specific word or passage, usually
influencing the meaning or effect" and "the set of circumstances or facts
that surround a particular event, situation, etc...." "Context" could also
mean "the fleshy, fibrous body of the pileus in mushrooms .. " It all depends on the "context" of the situation which meaning is intended. Are
we talking about contracts, mushrooms, or mushroom contracts?

Pierce, Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation,supra note 87, n.45.
105.
It appears surrounding circumstances evidence was provided through expert witnesses
in McGee, Hickman, and Caballo. McGee, 69 P.3d at 911 ("Many of these facts are also
established in this case through the affidavit of Jimmy Goolsby, a consulting geologist, submitted by appellants in support of their summary judgment motion and the affidavit of Anthony W. Gorody, an earth science professional, proffered by CCC in support of its motion
for summary judgment."); Hickman, 71 P.3d at 261 (referring to nine affidavits submitted by
the appellants and one affidavit submitted by the appellees); Caballo Coal Co., 89 P.3d at 314
n. I (referring to the affidavits of experts Goolsby and Gorody).
106.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Wyoming
Supreme Court adopted the Daubert analysis in Bunting v. Jamieson. 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo.
1999). See also Hannon v. State, 84 P.3d 320 (Wyo. 2004).
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where the evidence concerns "specialized" knowledge based upon observation and experience. 7
With regards to extrinsic evidence, the Wyoming Supreme Court
should resist attempts to pigeonhole extrinsic evidence by artificial definitions or categories, such as "surrounding circumstances." Instead, the court
should consider all relevant evidence that assists in determining the intent of
the parties. Although couched in terms of "circumstances" evidence, Professor Farnsworth offers the following useful guide:
The overarching principle of contract interpretation is that
the court is free to look at all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction. This includes the state of the
world, including the state of the law, at the time. It also includes all writings, oral statements, and other conduct by
which the parties manifested their assent, together with prior
negotiations between them and any applicable course of
dealing, course of performance, or usage. The entire agreement, including all writings, should be read together in the
light of all the circumstances. Since the purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain the meaning to be given to the language,
there should be no requirement that the language is ambiguous, vague,08 or otherwise uncertain before the inquiry is undertaken. 1
The court should also be vigilant to keep the parol evidence rule in
its proper place to ensure it does not infect the interpretive process. The
function of the parol evidence rule is to define the "terms" of the contract or
deed. Although application of the parol evidence rule may require some
preliminary interpretation," the rule should play no role in determining the

107.
Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). See generally,
Pierce, Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation, supra note 87 ("VI. PRESENTING USAGE
EVIDENCE AS FACT').
108.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs 467 (3d ed. 1999) (footnotes omitted).
109.
See supra note 27. For example, it is not possible to determine if a term in a prior
agreement "contradicts" the term of the writing until "meaning" is ascribed to the term in the
writing. E.g., Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448, 454 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1963) ("[T]he parol evidence rule does not even come into play until it is first
determined what the true agreement of the parties is - i.e., what they meant by what they
wrote down."). Following interpretation of the term at issue, the comparison can be made to
determine whether the prior agreement terms are consistent with the final written agreement.
Once the terms of the prior agreement are either included, or excluded, from the final written
agreement, the terms of the final written agreement are ready for the interpretation process.
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meaning of the terms it designates for interpretation."1 This is why any extrinsic evidence' can be considered to determine the meaning of terms.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

In cases where the parties had no specific intent regarding coalbed
methane, the jurisprudential decision will be whether an effort should be
made to ascertain their general intent, or merely resolve the issue by defining
their property rights as a matter of law. If the extrinsic evidence amounts to
nothing more than nobody at the time of the conveyance thought about coalbed methane as a valuable resource, the general intent approach will favor
the "gas" rights owner. However, one of the strengths, and weaknesses, of
extrinsic evidence is you never know what you are going to get, until you
dig in and see what is there.
The major benefit of resolving coalbed methane issues using "substantive property rules" is after a few cases, the issue will be decided. Once
this is done, courts should keep in mind that the only thing worse than a
"bad" property rule is one that changes. The Wyoming "procedural contract
principles" approach has generated four cases in less than two years. How-

ever, as the Wyoming Supreme Court articulates the contract interpretation
principles it will use to ascertain meaning, the bar and bench should be better
able to predict the appropriate outcome once they are able to identify the
admissible extrinsic evidence.
As a matter of public policy the problem is balancing freedom of
contract principles against predictability. When courts seek to ascertain
even the poorly expressed intent of the parties, they are trying to give effect
110. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
111.
The evidence still must be relevant and reliable to be admissible as a matter of evidentiary law. The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EvtD. 401. Therefore, in the interpretive context, any evidence that assists in determining
what the intent of the parties was, or was not, at the time the conveyance was entered into,
would be relevant. Similarly, what the current parties' present beliefs are would be irrelevant.
If the rights under the deed have been transferred to different parties, the intent of such successors in interest would not be relevant. What the original parties to the deed think about it
today would have no bearing on their intent at the point in time they entered into the conveyance. The reliability requirement is now stated in Rule 702 which provides,
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED.

R. EVID. 702.
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to the contract made by the parties. When courts adopt rules of law to resolve interpretive conflicts, they are opting for certainty of title and predictability which also tends to add to the value of the interest of the lucky
"owner." As I have written before, it is a pursuit of macro-justice at the expense, sometimes, of micro-justice." '2 The question then becomes, on who
should the burden of an incomplete or poorly drafted document fall? The
parties to the document or the public? At least with regard to coalbed methane, the Wyoming Supreme Court has opted to promote freedom of contract
by seeking to ascertain the intent of the parties.

112.
Pierce, Toward a FunctionalMineral Jurisprudence,supra note 7, at 244-50; David
E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing Search for
Analytical Foundations,47 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1-1, 1-26 to 1-28 (1996).
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